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This thesis discusses the causes which led to diplomatic 
representation on the part of the United States in Persia, 
the means by which such representation was established, and 
the first twenty years or so of its history. It covers the 
l imita t i ons of this relationship due to the Amer ican foreign 
policy of the time, that of non-involvement and non-interference 
in the domest i c affairs of Persia, and the positive contribu-
tion made by American missionaries in furthering friendly 
relations between the two countries. The thesis shows how 
America's lack of interest in Persia was contrasted with the 
Persian drive to enlist United States support in strengthening 
its ability to resist economic and political pressure, mainly 
from Russia, and how the Department of State repeatedly turned 
aside all advances made by Persia through the United States 
minister in Teheran and offered no encouragement to American 
business to become established there. It deals with the atti-
tude of Kurdish tribesmen toward Persian Christians, American 
missionaries, and the Persian central authority, and how 
their attitude influenced American diplomatic relations. 
FOREWORD 
The immediate causes of the establishment of a U,S. 
mission in Teheran and the regularization of diplomatic rela-
tions between the United States and Persia1 in 1883, and the 
history of that relationship during the next two decades were 
rooted in the role of the American missionaries in that coun-
try. The first of these missionaries arrived in Persia fifty-
three years before the United States Government stationed 
diplomatic representatives there, The missionaries had to 
rely on the good offices of friendly foreign diplomats for 
protection and gui dance. It was through thes e third parties, 
particularly the British, that the first contacts between the 
United States and Persia came about, the need for which arose 
from actual threats to the lives and safety of the missionaries. 
Even then, i t was wiih reluctance that the United States Govern-
ment established formal diplomatic relations. 
This study will examine the manner in which, and the 
reasons for, the missionary role in Persia influenced American 
fo r eign policy. It will also evaluate the effe ct iveness of 
the United States in protecting its citizens after the diplo-
matic relationship existed. 
It is difficult to understand the United States-Persian 
relationship without first considering Persian geo graphi cal 
position relative strategic factors, Rivalry betw een the newly 
1The name of the country of Persia was changed to the 
one used today--Iran--only in 1935, 
ii 
emerging western industrial powers attempting to find markets 
for manufactured goods and to gain control over raw materials 
placed any weak nation or people of an undeveloped area in the 
world in a highly vulnerable position. Persia was one of these 
which was torn between internal domestic pressure and external 
demands by western nations. It was basically these factors 
that brought the Shah of Persia to believe that the United 
States might throw a protective cloak over Persia and prevent 
the nation from being absorbed or dominated by a foreign 
power--mainly Russia. 
Nasir-ud-Din Shah encouraged American economic and mili-
tary aid in his endeavor to strengthen his country's ability 
to resist Russian and British influence. In contrast, the 
United States government resisted all these enticements of 
the Shah and remained aloof from any involvement in Persian 
affairs. An examination of the different attitudes expressed 
by the various United States ministers to Persia in relation 
to the official view of their government will be undertaken. 
This study also will illustrate the U.S. policy of non-
intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
a nation as expressed by President James Monroe in his message 
to Congress on December 2, 1823, which did not prevent the U.S. 
from opening diplomatic relations with Persia for the sole 
purpose of protecting a relatively small group of U.S. missiona-
ries. Because of the lack of any direct interest by the U.S. 
in expanding trade or influence in Persia, the U.S. was in a 
weak position to exercise any influence on Persia--outside of 
moral or legalistic influence--in protecting U.S. missionaries' 
iii 
lives and property. To a great extent the U,S. missionaries 
had to depend on diplomats from Grea t Britain in Persia for 
immedia te protection in outlying areas of the country, even 
after the U.S. minister arrived in Teheran. 
i✓ 
The problems and issues that developed between the United 
States and Persia between 1883 and 1900 formed the basis of 
the relationship between the two countries until World War II. 
Only aft er world events which began with World War II and the 
U,S. (and world) need for oil forced the United States to 
change its rather passive role toward Persia did it become a 
matter of national interest for the United States to pursue a 
policy of prov iding the economic, t echnical, and militar y sup-
port as the Shah and the U.S. minister to Persia had requested 
in the nineteenth century, 
Chapter 
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American Missionaries in Persia before 1880 
The image of the Middle East held by American people 
during the nineteenth century was as vague as that held by 
the leaders of that area with regard to the United States. 
The American people's ideas and impressions were acquired 
through Sunday school, the reading of the Arabian Nights, 
and, for a few, the study of school books on the ancient 
civilizations of Egypt and the Fertile Crescent. Ignorance 
of the United States by the people of the Middle East extended 
through all levels of society. Samuel Green Wheeler Benjamin, 
the first U.S . Minister to Persia (1883-1885), 1 reported that 
many Persian officials, including the Shah, had only the 
slightest impressions of the United States, 2 
In the light of this mutual lack of knowledge and aware-
ness, the question arises: How did Americ~ and particularly 
the Americans who became missionaries, select Persia for their 
activities? As a result of religious enthusiasm in England 
and the resultant founding of many missionary societies in the 
1790's, a similar religious interest developed quickly in 
America, resulting in the establishment of the American Board 
of Commissioners for Foreign Missions , which represented mainly 
1see Appendix I for list of U.S. Diplomatic Representa 
tives to Iran, 1883-1902. 
2 S .G.W. Benjamin, Persia and the Persians (London, 1887), 
p. 433. 
2 
Congregational and Presbyterian denominations in America. 
Many missionaries, both British and American, soon thereafter 
appeared in the Middle East. A report by a British Chaplain, 
Robert Walsh, in the Missionary Herald in 1826 concerning the 
Nestorian Church in Persia resulted in the Board's sending 
two Americans, Reverend Eli Smith and Reverend H.G.G. Dwight 
from the Ottoman Empire to survey the possibility of dispatch-
ing missionaries to Persia.3 
Smith and Dwight traveled to Syria, Asia Minor, Armenia, 
and Persia. They visited the northern part of Persia, staying 
in the city of Urmia (present-day Rezaieh), meeting the Nes-
torian bishops, and visiting many Nestorian villages. They 
were warmly received by these peoples. Rev. Mr. Smith observed, 
"I see that this field is white and ready for harvest. In 
all my journey I have seen no people as willing to accept the 
Gospel as the Assyrians of Persia. It is a good ·field for 
the work ..• 114 As a result of the receipt of this positive 
report and those of other missionaries in the Middle East 
regarding the difficulties being experienced in working among 
the non-Christians, the Board decided to establish the Mission 
to the Nestorians, with its permanent station at Urmia in 
3Robin E. Waterfield, Christians in Persia: Assyrians, 
Armenians, Roman Catholics and Protestants (New York, 1973), 
p. 102. (Hereinafter referred to as Christians in Persia.) 
4John Elder, Histor of the American Presb terian Mission 
to Iran, 1834-1960 Teheran, Iran, n.d. , p. 7, Hereinafter 
referred to as Presbyterian Mission.) 
north-western Persia. These efforts were to be directed at 
regeneration and revitalization of the native Christian 
Nestorians. 
J 
Who were the Nestorians? Where did they come from? How 
did they arrive in Persia? Christians came into Persia at a 
very early date. The Apostle Luke states in the Book of the 
Acts of the Apostles t hat Parthians, Medes, and Elamites were 
present in Jerusalem on the Day of Pentecost. 5 Perhaps some 
of these people converted and returned to Persia to practice 
their new beliefs. Tradition has it that two of the Apostles, 
St. Thomas and St. Bartholomew, traveled to Parthis and as 
fa r east as India, establishing Christianity wherever they 
visited. Quintus Ter tullian, one of the greatest of the 
early Christian writers in the west, said that Christians were 
in Persia before the Sassanians and that by 100 A.D., the 
Christian church in Persia was organized into a loosely 
federated episcopal see. 6 
In 4J1 A.D., the Christians living in the East led by 
Nestorius, Bishop of Constantinople, broke with western 
Christians over the latter's acceptance of the Virgin Mary as 
the "Mother of God". Persian Christians adhered to the b eliefs 
held by Nestorius; their church's golden age was from the fifth 
to the thirteenth centuries which was noted for its emphasis 
on education and its effective missionary spirit. It sent 
5Acts 2:9. King James Version. 
6waterfield, Christians in Pers ia, p. 16. 
missionaries to Central Asia, China, and India. 7 
The early church suffered at the hands of a strong and 
hostile state religion and was persecuted by the Sassanian 
rulers, The Islamic invasion of Persia in the seventh cen-
4 
tury resulted in the Arabs recognizing the legal status of the 
church and granting it prot ection. Although the devastating 
thirteenth century Mongol invasion of Persia resulted in 
great destruction and massacre of Persians, both Moslem and 
Christian, the Nestorian Church survived as the lv10ngols were 
tolerant towards religion. After the Mongols converted to 
Islam and with the invasion of Persia in the fourteenth cen-
tury by Tamerlane , the Nestorian church was reduced both in 
number and strength, It survived mainly in the Lake Van and 
Urmia regions along the Persian-Ottoman borders. Christianity 
became a small and insignificant movement. 8 The decline of 
Christianity in Persia in fact had begun prior to the Mongol · 
invasion, partly because it had never identified itself fully 
with the Persian state or people. Further, the church insisted 
on using the Syriac language in its worship, its theology was 
complicated, and it reli ed heavily on monasticism and with-
drawal from normal life,9 
By the nineteenth century the remaining Nestorian commu-
nity was located on the mountainous regions of northern Persia, 
bordering the Ottoman state, Nestorians were mostly poor and 
7waterfield, Christians in Persia, pp. 38-46 and Elder, 
Presbyterian ~ission, p. 8, 
8waterfield, Christians in Per s ia, pp. 52-54, 
9Ibid . , pp, 47-54. 
illiterate; of an estimated population of 125,000 in Persia, 
Ottoman state, and lviesopotamia, it was reported that only 
5 
forty men and one woman who was the sister of a patriarch were 
able to read. 10 Economic conditions were depressed, and health 
and sanitary provisions primitive , In 1830, the Nestorians 
were recovering gradually from a serious cholera epidemic which 
had reduced their numbers by fifty per cent. 11 
The inability of the central government in Teheran to 
exercise its authority over this vast mountainous area allowed 
Kurdish leaders virtual autonomy. The Nestorians, as a reli-
gious minority, were kept by the Kurds in a state tantamount 
to serfdom. 12 
The first American missionaries who arrived in this area 
were welcomed by the religious leaders of the Nestorian 
Church. They were invited to speak at the Sunday services 
and at services held on special Saint days. The missionaries 
soon realized that their most urgent problems were meeting 
the literary and medical needs of the Nestorians. The Reverend 
Justin Perkins, who reached Tabriz in August 1834 and founded 
the Persian Mission to the Nestorians, devoted most of his 
time to the translation of the Bible and other books into 
10 Elder, Presbyterian Mission_J_ p. 8. 
11waterfield, Christians in Persia, p. 102. 
12u.s., Congress, House, Protection of American Citizens 
in Persia. 47th Cong., 1st Sess. 1882. Executive Document, 
No. 151, March 30, 1882., p. 12. (Hereinafter referred to as 
Protection of American Citizens.) 
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modern Syriac. 13 The first printing press arrived in 1840 and 
shortly thereafter the first book was printed in modern Syriac. 
Soon after the arrival of Rev. Mr. Perkins, the first modern 
schools were established in Persia. The first school had just 
seven students on the first day, but by 1839-1840 the enroll-
ment had reached fifty-five. A school for girls followed with 
a first-day enrollment of four Nestorian girls. 14 
The arrival of' the American missionaries in the area 
where there existed a delicate balance between the different 
religious and ethnic groups had an initial adverse effect, 
not only did it cause tension between local Kurdish hordes 
and their Nestorian "vassals," but it also spurred competition 
among western missionaries working in the immediate area. The 
Americans confronted the proselytizing efforts of Roman 
Catholic and Russian Orthodox clergy as well as missionaries 
sent from England, all of whom preceded the Americans. 15 It 
was said by an American missionary that "Mohammedans, Musco-
vites and Monks furnish their full quota of opposition. 1116 
The Kurdish leaders became very suspicious and jealous 
of the attention given to the Nestorians by all of these 
13Justin Perkins, A Residence of Eight Years in Persia 
(New Yor~, 1843), pp. 316-JJO. 
14E b t . 1\1 • • 10 12 lder, Pres y er1an l1ss1on, pp. - • 
1.5waterfield, Christians in Persia, pp. 102-111. 
16John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the 
Middle East, 1900-1939 (Minneapolis, 1963), p. 11. (Herein-
after referred to as American Interests and Policies.) 
7 
western missionaries. They were concerned lest they lose 
their position and power in the region of their livelihood. 
Many missionaries encouraged their fellow Christians--the 
Nestorians.--to resist Kurdish rule al though with no possible 
chance for assistance from outside. Tension developed between 
the Nestorians and the Kurds, resulting in open hostility. 17 
The basic cause w&s more economic and political than religious: 
in 1841 the Kurdish leader, Nasrullah Khan, attacked and des-
troyed the home of the Nestorian patriarch. Conflicts continued 
to increase during the early 1840's, culminating in 1846 in the 
revolt of the Nestorians in the 1Viosul area near the Ottoman 
border. It was estimated that 10,000 Nestorians were killed 
in their vain attempt to redress grievances. The result of 
this tragic experience was that some of them turned against 
the American missionaries. Peace between them and the Kurds 
was restored only after the arrival of the Ottoman army. 18 
During these early years, the American missionaries 
concentrated their efforts on improving the living conditions 
of the Nestorians. A report by the British Consul General at 
Tabriz to his government stated that no attempt was made to 
Interfere with the religious practices of the Nestorians and 
the authority of the Nestorian bishops. 19 Converts were 
17waterfield, Christians in Persia, p. 110. 
18Ibid., pp. 106-108. 
19u.s., Congress, House, Protection of American Citizens, 
Enclosure 2 in No. 102. 
8 
encouraged to remain with the established Nestorian Church. 
The missionaries devoted themselves to establishing schools for 
both boys and girls, furnishing medical aid, and improving 
general health conditions. 
Gradually the missionaries shifted their emphasis away 
from working with the Nestorian Church and its ecclesiastical 
hierarchy to working with the Nestorian people in separate 
congregations having their own clerical structure. Those 
missionaries arriving in the 1850's considered the old church 
lacking in vitality. The Nestorian community became divided 
between their old established church and the new "protestant" 
church. 
By 1860, the American missionaries became eager to extend 
their activities to the conversion of those regarded as hea-
thens and began searching for other people to proselytize. 
Gradually the mission extended its efforts beyond the Nes-
t orians to other non-Moslem people in Persia, including 
Christian Armenians and Jewish Persians, which had the result 
of placing them immediately in opposition to Armenian and 
Jewish religious leaders. The main attraction that drew the 
Armenian and Jewish people to the Americans was the possibi-
lity of sending their children to the American mission schools 
and these schools grew slowly but fairly steadily because of 
this. 
A major change in the American missionary thrust in 
Persia occurred on December 17, 1870, when the American Board 
of Foreign Missions split, and the Presbyterians withdrew 
9 
their support. The Board became a Congregational organization, 
concentrating its efforts in Ottoman regions and leaving the 
Persian mission field to the Presbyterians. The new Presby-
terian missionaries broadened their field of activity among 
the people of Persia, Christian Nestorians and Armenians, 
Jews, and for the first time, lVioslems. Their new goal was to 
20 proselytize all non-Protestant peoples, Prior to 1870, Ameri-
can missionary work was concentrated mainly in the vicinity of 
the village of Urmia and among the Nestorians; after that year, 
new mission stations were established in Teheran, Tabriz (1873), 
and in Hamadan (1879). In each location, schools, clinics, 
and small hospitals were built. 21 
The official attitude of the Persian government during 
these early years was one of toleration of the American mis-
sionaries. It had little concern over their attempts to con-
vert Armenians, Nestorians, and Jews to Protestantism; however, 
this attitude held only for non-Moslems. 22 The missionaries 
had encountered opposition from the established leadership of 
these various minorities. For example, in 1874, Armenian 
priests stirred up Moslem ecclesiastics against American 
20Elder, Presbyterian Mission, pp. 23-24, 
21Waterfield, Christians in Persia, pp. 133-138. 
22J .L. Potter, "Religious Liberty in Persia," 43 The 
Moslem World, III, 1 (Jan. 1913), ~-
10 
missionary activity and a number of Moslems attending services 
were beaten. 2.3 It was claimed that the Russian government, 
worried over increased American and British influence, 
encouraged Armenian Church leaders to create opposition against 
the American missionaries. 24 At this time, although the mis-
sionaries experienced opposition from local Moslem religious 
leaders and municipal government officials under pressure from 
these religious leaders, no Persian official from Teheran, 
including the Shah, openly opposed the missionary activities 
as long as they were directed at the non-Moslem population of 
their country. In 1851, the Shah, Nasir-ud-Din, actually 
aided the missionaries' efforts by repealing an 1842 edict 
which prohibited their proselytizing among native Christian 
groups. 25 On occasion, American missionaries had to appeal 
to Persian authorities for protection against threats to 
their lives and property by Nestorian, Armenian, and Jewish 
leaders. 26 A greater threat to the safety of the American 
missionary, however, arose from the inability of the central 
government in Teheran to maintain law and order throughout 
the country, especially in the remote areas, 
23Robert E. Speer, "Growth of Religious Liberty in Persia," 
The Missionary Review of the World, XLV, 8 (Jan. 1948) 6.35, 
24Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, p. 4.3.3, 
25Abrahim Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic 
Relations, 1883-1921 (New Brunswick, 1956), p. 9, (Hereinafter 
referred to as Persian Diplomatic Relations.) 
26Potter, "Religious Liberty in Persia," p. 42. 
11 
During these early years prior to the arrival of the 
first American Minister in 1883, Americans living in Persia 
requested and were granted protection by the British Consul 
General living in Tabriz. Upon the latter's withdrawal from 
Tabriz, the Russian Consul General gave assistance to the 
Americans until 1851 when once again the missionaries received 
British protection, which assistance continued until 1883. 27 
American Attitude toward Persia in the Nineteenth Century 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the American foreign 
policy makers were chiefly concerned with the maintenance and 
advancement of U.S. interests in the Western Hemishpere and 
the Pacific Ocean, mainly to China and Japan. The Middle 
East was not considered of any political interest to the 
United States. For example, the United States was determined 
to cut a canal through Central America, but was relatively 
indiffer:ent to the problems of the Turkish Straits or the 
Suez Cana1. 28 It was, however, toward the end of the century 
after the United States became more industrialized and needed 
markets for both its raw materials and finished goods when 
the American policymakers gradually developed an interest in 
the lVi iddle East. 
In spite of this lack of interest in the Middle East, 
American authorities felt responsible for and insisted on 
27waterfield, Christians in Persia, p. 103. 
28Harry N. Howard, "The United States and the Problems 
of the Turkish Straits, 11 The ivdddle East Journal, I, 1 (Jan. 
1947), .59-62. 
12 
the right to protect U.S. citizens, wherever they were. 29 
U.S. diplomatic relations with Persia began in the 185O's 
when, at Persia's instigation, efforts were made to negotiate 
a treaty between the two countries. The initial steps were 
taken by George P. Marsh, American Minister Resident at 
Constantinople (Istanbul), and the Persian government. A 
treaty was signed on October 9, 1851; however, this treaty 
never entered into force. Under pressure from Great Britain, 
Nasir-ud-Din Shah took no final action, thus causing the 
treaty to die. 30 
Great Britain considered Persia to be within its sphere 
of influence and looked with displeasure on any nation display-
ing an interest in Persia. In 1854, the Persian charged' 
affaires in Constantinople contacted the United States Minister 
Resident, Carrol Spence, and indicated the Persian desire to 
reopen negotiations. Tension between Persia and Great Britain 
was increas ing over Afghanistan, and in 1856, the situation 
erupted in warfare. Spence advised the American State 
Department that Persia was interested in purchasing American 
warships and obtaining the services of American naval person-
nel. He also expressed the belief that Russia was now 
encouraging the Persians to get the United States involved as 
29DeNovo, American Interests and Policies, p. 18. 
30J.C. Hurewitz, in the Near and Middle East, 
V~~o=l~•-:-::I~,:---:=1~5~3~5~-~1~2~1~4_1_=Ac--=:=.:.::.==:..:::.:::::.:...i._:.:R~e~c~o~r-=d , Princeton, 195 
pp. 158-159. 
13 
a counterbalance to British interests in the country. 31 
In Vienna, Persia again requested the American Minister 
there for naval assistance included in a draft of a treaty, 
In May and J une 1857, the State Department sought the aid of 
Russia in the Persian-American negotiations. The American 
government b elieved that not only Great Britain would try to 
defeat the negotiations between the United States and Persia, 
but France would also. The American Minister in Constantinople 
continued to be the chief negotiator and was approached by 
the Persian charge d'affaires to seek American naval aid in 
the defense of Persia. During these negotiations, Spence 
outlined U.& policy of non-int ervention, but emphasiz ed the 
benefits that could be realized from the competition of American 
traders in a market dominated by Great Britain. 32 
Russia eventually withdrew her support of the treaty. 
Subsequent to its defeat in the Anglo-Persian War (1856-1857), 
the Persian government saw no immediate advantage for American 
diplomatic interest in her affairs; thus, the Persian govern-
ment 's interest in obtaining the expansion of American diplo-
matic representation in Persia ebbed. Deeply involved in 
America's own domestic problem over slavery, U.Sa officials 
showed little interest in becoming entangled in the politica l 
affairs of Persia. In his inaugural address, President James 
Buchanan outlined the position of American diplomacy as being 
31Yeselson, Persian D~plomatic Rel a t i ons, pp. 20-21. 
32Ibid. , p. 21. 
14 
for "peace, commerce and friendship with all nations," and the 
avoidance of foreign entanglement and interference in domes-
tic affairs of other states.33 A Persian-American treaty, 
however, was approved in August 1857 during the administration 
of President Franklin Pierce and was forwarded to the United 
States Senate by President Buchanan. The Senators were advised 
that the treaty was beneficial to American trade and was urged 
to appropriate funds to establish a legation. The treaty was 
approved by Persia, ratified by the U.S. Senate on 1V1arch 12, 
1857, but the Senate failed to appropriate funds for estab-
1 . h. t· · p · 34 is ing a lega ion in ersia. Congressmen had had little 
interest in this remote area of the world as their attention 
was directed at the immediate problems of slavery and maintain-
ing the Union. On a number of occasions Persian officials, 
both in London and St. Petersburg, expressed their desire to 
U.S. officials for establishing diplomatic relations with the 
United States. 35 
Some twelve to thirteen years later, there came an occa-
sion for a change in the U.S. government policy toward Persia 
which resulted from threats to lives and property of American 
missionaries working there. This threat came from the invasion 
of Persia by Kurdish tribesmen from Ottoman territory. Seeds 
33James D. Richardson, ed. A Compilation of the Messages 
and Pa ers of the Presidents (New York, 1897), p. 435, Vol. V. 
Hereinafter referred to as Iv1essages of the Presidents.) 
34Hunter Miller, ed. Treaties and Other International Acts 
of the United States of America (Washington, 1942), pp. 429-488. 
35Richardson, Messages of the Presidents, p. 435. 
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sown by the Russians among Kurdish chieftains within the 
Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Ottoman wars of 1829, 1853-1855, 
and 1876-1878, encouraging them to revolt against Ottoman 
rule, gradually developed into a movement for a Kurdish 
autonomous state. In 1880, Kurdish chieftain Obeydollah tried 
to unite the Kurdish tribes living in Ottoman territory and Per-
sia under his rule. 36 Kurdish leaders claimed the grievous 
maltreatment by both Ottomans and Persian authorities forced 
them into striking their blow for the tribal freedom and auto-
nomy.37 
A Kurdish force moved into the plain of Urmia driving 
toward the major Persian city of Tabriz, a territory dotted 
with approximately 2,000 villages of which 120 or so were 
occupied by Nestorians. The Kurds, in addition to being 
invaders who considered the Persians to be enemies, were also 
Sunni, whereas the Persians were Shlcites. A deep and lasting 
animosity already existed between these two Islamic elements; 
the Persian Shicite population, together with the Nestorians, 
Armenians, and Jews, suffered at the hands of the invading 
Kurds. 38 
36Hassan Arfa, The Kurdsz An Historical Political Study 
(London, 1966), pp. 23-24. 
37 U.S., Congress, House. Protection of American Citizens, 
p. 12. 
38Rufus R. Dawes, A History of the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations with Persia (Marietta, Ohio, ~887), p. 16. 
Hereinafter referr·ed to as History of Diplomatic Relations.) 
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At this time, there were fourteen American missionaries 
stationed in the Urmia sector, A member of the 47th Congress, 
Representative Rufus R. Dawes of Marietta, Ohio, had a sister 
who served as a missionary in Urmia along with her husband and 
family. After learning of the Kurdish invasion from reading 
newspaper reports of the events and realizing the threat to 
the Christian missionaries in the area, IV~r. Dawes requested 
the Secretary of State, William M. Evarts, to appeal to the 
Persian government to protect the lives of the missionaries. 
The Secretary informed him that this would be impossible 
because the United States had no representative in Persia, but 
assured him that the American Minister in London would be 
instructed to request the good offices of Great Britain to 
protect American interests in Persia. The British government 
responded favorably to the U.S. request and instructions were 
sent by London to the British Consul General at Tabri~, 
William G. Abbott, to offer whatever assistance might be neces-
sary for the safety of the missionaries in that area. At the 
time the Kurdish forces attacked Urmia the English Consul 
General, coincidentally, was a guest of the missionaries and 
was caught along with them within the Kurdish line. The 
missionaries' cottage was located on Mt. Seir, six miles 
outside the town near where the Kurdish forces had taken up 
position looking down over Urmia. 39 
39nawes, History of Diplomatic Relations, pp. 1-8. 
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Consul Abbott reported to Foreign Secretary Earl Granville 
that the Union Jack floated side by side with the Stars and 
Stripes over the missionary buildings and a sign on the outside 
identified "the residence of the British Consul and the Ameri-
11 . • • .,40 can v11ss1onar1es. A copy of his report was forwarded to the 
American Secretary of State, which stated that the missionaries 
opened their compound to approximately three hundred Persians 
and Nestorians. He denied the story that the missionaries 
sided with the Kurds against the Persians: " .•• the U.S. 
have every reason to be proud of men who, at all times conspi-
cuous for their practical piety, displayed at Urmia, amidst 
famine, pestilence and war, a coolness and pluck which will 
never be forgotten by those who were present, •• 1141 
The Kurds failed to capture Urmia and the Persian army 
succeeded in driving the remnant away from the environs. The 
Kurds had treated the missionaries with respect; but this did 
not make matters easier, because the missionaries were placed 
in a very difficult position, that of not wanting to favor 
either side in the struggle. 42 
The British Minister to Teheran, in accordance with 
instructions received from London, interceded on behalf of 
the American missionaries by requesting the Shah's government 





to take extra measures for the protection of the missions 
in Urmia. Upon instructions from the Shah, the Persian Min-
ister of War, Sepah Salar, who was given the responsibility 
for defeating the Kurds, assured the missionaries of his pro-
tection and added that the Shah's government appreciated the 
integrity and sincerity of the missionaries' past actions in 
Persia. The U.S. State Department expressed the appreciation 
of President Chester A. Arthur to the British government for 
the promptness and good will displayed by the British offi-
cials in responding to the U.S. request for assistance. 43 
Even after the fighting subsided, the British Mission to 
Persia continued to play a protective role over the U.S. 
missionaries there. The British government was formally requested 
by the U.S. State Department to continue to protect the mission-
aries in March of 1882. In May of the year before, the Bri-
tish government transmitted copies of new regulations to the 
State Department issued by the Persian government forbidding 
prosecution of converts from Judaism to Christianity, and 
one on prohibiting the teaching of religion in the missionary 
schools. 44 It had always been the policy of the Persian govern-
ment to grant religious freedom to non-Moslems, but to strictly 
prevent any attempt to teach Christianity to lVioslems. 
43u.s., Congress, House, Protection of American Citizens, 
p, 18. 
44Ib" 21 24 --1:Q., PP• - • 
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Establishment of Diplomatic Relations 
In 1882, the relationship between the missionaries and 
the Persian government began to become tense over the desires 
of the missionaries to proselytize among Persians. The 
Persian government would not tolerate any attempt by the 
missionaries to teach Christian religious beliefs to the 
Moslems, either at the school, or at the church. Strict 
orders were issued by the Persian government and Ivl oslems were 
threatened with arrest and punishment if found attending such 
services. The missionaries were not inclined to abide by the 
orders and thereby imp.eriled their own position in the country 
and even their lives. 45 The need for official protection from 
the U.S. government became more acute under these circum-
stances. The British government kept the American State 
Department informed of the events in Persia and the U.S. 
government counselled the friends of the missionaries to 
refrain from any extreme actions in Persia which would place 
the British representatives in a difficult position in any of 
their attempts to protect the missionaries. The need to estab-
lish U.S. diplomatic relations with Persia in order to protect 
the lives and interests of U.S. citizens, mainly those of the 
. . . "d t d . th· · d 46 m1ss1onar1es, became ev1 en uring is per10 . · 
A resolution of inquiry was passed by the House of 
Representatives on February 13, 1882, to President Arthur 
45 U.S., Congress, House. Protection of American Citizens, 
p I 24 I 
46rb· 24 25 ----1.Q I I pp I - I 
20 
through the Secretary of State, regarding the protection of 
American citizens in Persia. The Secretary of State reported 
to the House that since America had no diplomatic relations 
with Persia, it could not directly protect American citizens 
in that country, but he did state that he would contact the 
British government for assistance. The British quickly and 
affirmatively responded to this request. 
While the U.S. State Department was requesting British 
protection for its missionaries in Persia, the U.S. Represen-
tative, Rufus R. Dawes, maneuvered with his friends in the 
House to take the initiative of opening official relations 
with Persia. In the pursuit of his objective, for. Dawes 
introduced a joint resolution (H.R. No. 195) in the 47th 
Congress a uthorizing the Secretary of State to establish dip-
lomatic relations with Persia. This resolution was passed to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs where opposition developed. 
This opposition centered around the lack of action by the 
Committee on a prior item (the imprisonment of Irish-Americans 
in British jails and granting relief for those in Ireland). 47 
On July 15, 1882, Charles G. Williams, Chairman of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, introduced House Resolution 6743 
for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Persia. As 
a result of this House Resolution, the Secretary of State 
recommended to the President that it would be advantageous to 
Am eri can interests, both personal and commercial, to develop 
47Dawes, History of Diplomatic Relations, pp. 39-40. 
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. t· t· "th P . 48 more in imate rela ions wi ersia. It took the Committee 
three months to report back to the House recommending a bill 
for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Persia. 49 
Because of the press of business and Hous e rules, the bill 
had little chance of passing in that Congressional session. 
It was possible for bills to be taken up out of order and 
voted upon in the final six days of the session, depending 
upon the interests of the committee. Williams, a special 
friend of Dawes, with the strong support of John A. Kasson, who 
as a Iv1inister to Austria had recommended the establishment of 
relations with Persia a number of years before, accomplished 
thi s near i mpossible task.50 
In the discus.sion that followed in the House in support 
of the bill, Kasson emphasized the possibility of trade with 
Persia, especially in American cotton and petroleum.51 He 
pointed out that cotton grown in the U.S. was being shipped 
first to Great Britain, thence to Persia. He added that all 
great trading nations of Europe had emissaries in Persia and 
t he United States, a nation of traders, should be represented 
also. The members of the committee discus s ed the importance 
of Persia's geographical position and the role of the American 
48 Dawes, History of Diplomatic Relations, p. 27. 
49Ibid., p. 43. 
50I bid., pp. 42-43 
Relations with Persia. 
1888) I P• 4. 
and U.S., Congress, House, Commercia l 
House Report No. 1648 (Washington, 
51Dawes, History of Diplomatic Relations, p. 44. 
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missionary within Persia. This country had more missionaries 
in Persia than any other nation; therefore, we should not 
have to depend upon the British for this protection. 52 
Strong support for the bill came from l:J1r. Andrew G. Curtin, 
former governor of Pennsylvania and ex-minister to Russia, now 
a member of Congress. "He was one of the most dignified and 
finished orators in Congress. 1153 Thus, Dawes had strong sup-
port from a few influential members of the House, two former 
ministers to Austria (Kasson and Godlove S. Orth of Indiana), 
a former minister to Russia (Curtin), and Chairman of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Williams. Dawes indi-
cated that he had little or no support outside of Congress, 
the public having little or no knowledge of Persia and having 
exerted no pressure on its representatives to have relations 
established with Persia. 54 "The only favorable sy.•nptom descri-
bable was a general disposition in Congress to talk loud and 
long in favor of American citizens in foreign 1ands. 1155 
With the passage of the bill in the House, only two days 
were left for Senate action. The same influential men of the 
House who had pushed the bill in their chamber, appealed to 
William Windom, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, to call a quorum on August 4, 1882, for considera-
tion of the bill. The Committee adopted a favorable report, 
52Dawes, History of Di12lomatic Relations, P• 46. 
53Ibid _., P• 47. 
54Yeselson, Persian Di12lomatic Relations, p. 25. 
55nawes, History of Di12lomatic Relations, P• 27. 
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passed it to the Senate and after ten minutes of consideration, 
the bill was passed by unanimous consent, becoming law when 
signed by President Arthur three days later. Dawes immediately 
requested the Secretary of State, Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, 
to telegraph ~he news to the Persian government officially, 
which was done on the same day through the American and Pers ian 
ambassadors in London. Congress had authorized the sending 
of a charge d'affaires and consul general to Teheran. The 
American ambassador also notified the British. 
Congress adjourned on August 8 before action was taken 
by the Secretary of State on selecting the first minister to 
Persia. After conferring with Dr. Ireneus Prime of New York, 
the Secretary of State selected Rev. Henry Jessup, D.D., for-
mer missionary to Syria. He tur ned the appointment down.55 
Secretary of State Frelinghuys en's next act was to send 
a list of possible choices to Mr. Dawes and requested him to 
confer with Messrs. Rice and Curtin in making a recommendation. 
Included in this list was the name of Samuel G.W. Benjamin, a 
man who had lived in the Near East for over twenty years, 
knew Greek, Turkish, and French, and had published a book 
entitled The Turk a nd the Gr eek in 1867. This was the man 
whose name was recommended to the President by the Secretary 
of State, after his selection by Dawes and his conferees. 
President Chester A. Arthur accepted the recommendation and 
55Dawes, History of Diplomatic Rela tions, pp. 53-54. 
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appointed Benjamin to become the new Minister Resident to 
Persia on January 29, 188J. On February 14, he was informed 
of his appointment by the Secretary of State; however, the title 
of his position was changed to that of Charge d'Affaires and 
Consul General of the United States to Persia prior to his 
departure. This increased rank carried no equivalent increase 
in basic salary, which was $5,000, plus $J,OOO for expenses.56 
56numas Malone, et. al. , eds., 'I'he Dictionary of American 
Biograph~, II (New York, 1928), p. 198. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FIRST DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO PERSIA, 1883 
The selection of Mr. S.G.W. Benjamin as the first diplo-
matic representative of the United States to Persia was a 
remarkable choice for America to send to a land where minimum 
involvement was anticipated. Benjamin was born in Argos, Greece 
on February 13, 1837, the son of an American missionary father, 
and spent his first eighteen years in Athens, Smyrna, and 
Constantinople. His personal characteristics were not ideal 
for diplomatic service as he was not accustomed to a routine 
and lacked self-discipline. He was energetic, quick, versatile, 
1 romanti c, and concei ted, and ha d a volatile temperament. He 
was a writer of both books and magazine articles, his subjects 
being mainly art and travel. As an author, he was conscien-
tious in assembling his material, but careless in its compo-
·t· 2 si ion. He was also a mariner and painter of marine subjects; 
his paintings were aimed at boldness and force rather than 
refinement. 3 They sold at prices ranging from $60 to $600. 
As a mariner, he made fo r ty-five voyages across the Atlantic 
Ocean and was noted for his ability to withstand the roughest 
weather without becoming seasick, which he attributed to his 
1 G.N. Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, I (New 
York, 1892), p. 23 and Malone, The Dictionary of American 
Biography. p. 189. 
2Malone, The Dictionary of American Biography, p. 189. 
3curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, p. 23. 
use of whiskey and tobacco, and the avoidance of drinking 
water. 4 
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Benjamin departed New York on April 4, 1883 for Teheran 
via Bordeaux, Marseille, Constantinople, and from there by 
land to the Ottoman port cities of Trabzon and Batumi (a city 
now held by Russia) on the Black Sea. Travel between the last 
two cities was by steamer. From Batumi he continued to the 
port city of Poti from which he continued by rail to Tiflis 
(TbilisD and finally to Baku on the Caspian Sea. There he 
smelled the peculiar odor that was ever-present in the air 
and determined it to be the petroleum that saturated the earth 
in the area.5 He departed Baku via steamer and arrived at a 
small Persian port of Enzeli, present-day Bandar Pahlavi, 
from which the Shah d.espatched his steam-yacht to take Benja-
min on board with his family. 6 
Upon his arrival at Enzeli, he was met by officials of 
the Shah who made arrangements for the final portion of the 
trip to the capital of Persia, Teheran. His party of some 
fifty people proceeded slowly to Teheran, the journey hindered 
by the slow progress of the Russian Minister who preceded him 
with ninety-six horses loaded with baggage. No two foreign 
envoys could enter Teheran on the same day, according to 
4 John W. Leonard, ed. Who's Who in America, 1914-1913 
(Chicago, 1916), p. 171. 
5Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, p. 15. 
6Despatch from U.S. Minister to Persia, 1883-1906. 
State Dept. Microfilm Roll No. 1, I Microcopy No. 223. 




Persian protocol, and it was, therefore, necessary for Benjamin 
to remain one day's journey behind the Russian minister. His 
slow and tedious trip was interrupted by a messenger from 
the Shah urging his speedy arrival at the capital because the 
Shah was departing the city on June 11 for the summer. His 
arrival after the Shah's departure would have meant that he 
would have had to postpone entering the capital until the 
Shah's return in October. Benjamin left his wife and daughter, 
and hurried by horseback to Teheran, a trip of 220 miles. 7 
Wishing to show good will toward the first United States 
envoy, the Shah sent a carriage to meet Benjamin at Qazvin, 
which permitted him to ride the last eighty miles to Teheran 
on a fine road. He arrived outside Teheran on the ninth of 
June, sixty-five days after sailing from New York. The Russian 
Minister was received by the Shah on June 10 and Benjamin the 
next d~y at the Shah's pavilion near the gates of the city. 
The Shah extended to the American full civilian and military 
honors, and had him escorted to his quarters in Teheran by a 
8 regiment of cavalry. 
During the audience, the Shah remained standing and talked 
with Benjamin in French. His manner was easy, and he expressed 
his opinion that both countries could benefit by maintaining 
diplomatic relations. He was interested in learning if the 
United States intended to maintain a permanent legation or 
7Despatch from u.s. Ministers, Dip. Ser. No. 10 dated 
Jan. 13, 1883 and Ali Pasha Saleh, Cultural Ties between Iran 
and the United States (Teheran, 197~), p. 249. 
8Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, p. 42. 
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only a temporary one. When the U.S. Minister replied that 
the legation would be permanent, the Shah responded that he 
hoped that it would be so. Benjamin was impressed by the 
Shah's appearance and mannerisms which made him appear younger 
than his age of fifty-six. 9 
Benjamin's immediate problem was a physical one--that of 
locating quarters and personnel--servants and staff for the 
legation within Teheran. Temporary lodging in the city was 
provided him through the efforts of the American missionaries, 
He was forced to remain in the city through the extreme heat 
of that first summer although it was the custom of legations 
to move to the cooler f oo t hills each summer for work. His 
early despatches to the State Department were devoted to 
explanations of his attempts to purchase a carriage, horse, 
and harness; hire a driver; locate a suitable house; and order 
stationery, printed forms, and ordinary appliances for busi-
ness , staying within the meager budget allowed by the State 
Department. He was forced to augment his allowance from his 
personal funds in order to obta in some of the bare essentials 
for living in the country. The furnishings for his office came 
to $360, of which he paid $125 from his own pocket. 11 The 
first American flag was made by missionary ladi es with the 
9Despatch from U.S. I✓iinister, Dip. Ser. No. 10 dated 
Jan. 13, 1883 and Benjamin, Pers i a and the Persians, pp. 190-193, 
10 4 Saleh, Cultural Ties between Iran, p. 2 9, 
11Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip, Ser. No. 14 dated 
June 18, 1883. 
29 
help of Benjamin's wife and daughter. When completed, it was 
probably the first American flag ever raised in the city of 
Teheran. The flagstaff proved expensive, over $200. 
Benjamin was confronted shortly with many of the issues 
and influences that were to dominate and develop into the 
fundamental basis of the relationship between America and 
Persia prior to World War II. He quickly became aware of 
the Russian influence and designs for dominating Persia, and 
Persia's efforts to enlist American support for resisting the 
pressures of the great powers, Russia and Great Britain~ 12 
and he soon became involved in protecting U.S. missionary roles 
in the country. 13 This l a tter f acet of the U.S.-Persian 
relationship would absorb much of the U.S. representatives' 
time until the early twentieth century. 
The third matter that interested Benjamin, which he 
reported to the Department and which recurred in numerous 
report s by subsequent representatives of the U,S, in Persia, 
was the possibility of establishing and increasing commercial 
relations between the two nations. Secretary of State 
Frelinghuysen had never informed Benjamin that the primary 
reason for sending him to Persia was the protection of U.S. 
missionaries. Trade was not encouraged by the State Depart-
ment, nor was the idea received enthusiastically by the U.S. 
12Despatch from U,S. Minister, Dip. Ser, No. 23 dated 
July 19, 1883, 
l3Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser, No. 20 dated 
July 5, 1883. 
. 1. t t 14 commerc1a in eres s. President Arthur, in his fourth 
JO 
annual message to Congress in December of 1884, emphasized 
that "countries of the American continent and the adjacent 
islands are for the United States the natural nests of supply 
and demands, 111 .5 which seemed to preclude extended involvement 
in Persia. 
As early as July 1883, Benjamin reported to the State 
Department the feasibility of developing commercial relations 
between the two countries. He cited items produced in the 
U.S. which would be of interest to Persia: firearms, furniture, 
cloth, clocks, tobacco, cotton, woolen goods, shoes, and paper, 
in return for whi ch Persia could export silks, dried fruits, 
artistic bric-a-brac, rugs, and textiles. Benjamin reported 
additionally that valuable commercial concessions might be 
arranged for U.S. companies for exploitation of Persia's rich 
coal, lead, copper, and petroleum reserves. 
Meanwhile, John A. Kasson, former American lViinister to 
Austria and now member of Congress, noted in a communica tion 
to the Secretary of State dated July 12, 1878, that the esti-
mated annual external trade of Persia amounted to $18-20,000,000, 
of which approximat ely $12,000,000 were imports and $7,000,000 
exports. Cotton goods and yarns formed a large part of the 
imports. Kasson mentioned firearms and other specialities of 
14 U.S. Congress, Hous e, Commercial Relations with Persia, 
Report No. 1648, 47th Congress, 1st Ses s ., 1882, p. 4. 
15James D. Richardson, ed., Messages of Presidents, p. 
48J8. 
the U. s. could possibly be considered for trade. 16 
The subject of developing such relations was again 
discussed in the Minister's second audience with the Shah. 
.31 
This and other topics discussed in the audience was duly 
reported in the capital of Teheran and created much interest 
among the diplomatic corps there, especially among the Russians 
and British. Nasir-ud-Din Shah urged the U.S. to increase 
commerce with his country and questioned the minister on the 
possibility of the Shah visiting the U.S. and the conditions 
of the voyage across the Atlantic Ocean. He was searching 
desperately for trade, investments, and, possibly, support of 
a third power to balance the economic, political, and military 
pressures of--mainly--Russia. The Shah believed that the U.S. 
could act as a balance against further Russian expansion. 
There seemed very little to fear from the U.S. in the form 
of economic domination, and there was much to gain from intro~ 
ducing new investment capital and an alternative to trading with 
Russia and England. 17 
On the whole, Benjamin supported the missionaries' role 
in Persia and defended their rights most vigorously with the 
Persian government. In return, the U.S. missionaries respected 
and praised actions taken by him. At the same time, Benjamin 
chastised the missionaries for th:eir attempts to proselytize 
16u.s., Cong., House, Commercial Relations with Persia, 
p. 4. 
17Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 18. 
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Moslems and defended the Persians who opposed their attempts 
18 to convert Moslems. Some missionaries in Persia believed 
that if they could not convert Moslems, there was no point 
to their being there. 19 In a letter to a missionary in Tabriz, 
Benjamin cautioned against any efforts of such conversions, 
because the converted Moslem would possibly be killed by the 
people under the guidance of their religious leaders. This ·. 
could create a problem which could result in the loss of life 
20 among the foreign colony in the country. 
By 1884, the American missionary colony consisted of 
twenty-four American missionaries and their families at Urmia, 
Teheran, Hamadan, and Tabriz, all in the northern part of Persia. 
These missionaries were assisted by 230 native teachers, mostly 
Nestorians. They had established twenty-five churches of 
1,726 communicants and 4,578 persons attending services; 208 
pupils lived in missionary boarding schools, and 2,452 attended 
day school. One of the major emphases of the missionaries was 
the translation of the Bible into the local dialect commonly 
used by the Nestorians and printing of books for their schools' 
use. In support of these activities, the missionaries printed 
1,680,890 pages of educational and religious material in 1884.
21 
18Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, pp. 360-.362. 
19nespatch f r om U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 81 dated 
Aug. 15, 1884. 
20nespatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 81 dated 
Aug. 15, 1884. 
21Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 11. 
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the acquisitions of the Americans--property, schools, houses, 
and land--were considerable. The Treaty of Turkomanchai (1828) 
granted Russia the right to protect property in Persia by the 
most favored nation clause. This clause was included in the 
U.S. t rade treaty; therefore, the purchase of property was 
permitted although it resulted in growing suspicion by the 
Moslems. 22 
The problems that developed between the missionaries and 
the Persian authorities were largely unavoidable for Persian 
law did not recognize the right of Moslems to desert their 
religion and forbade them to receive Christian training or to 
attend church services . Th e missionaries contended that this 
did not prohibit preaching; they were not bound by Pers ian l aw. 
Benjamin strove to understand both positions. He wrote 
that "It is not difficul t to imagine what would be the feeling 
of a Protestant, or a Roman Catholic, or a Hebrew father in 
the United States, who should see a priest of a faith he 
detests exerting every effort, however honestly, to lead his 
child from the faith of its fathers. 1123 At the same time, 
Benjamin defended American citizens to the Pers ian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs by sayings 
American citizens are not law-breakers, rest 
assured of that, I am responsible that they 
do not invite Mussulmen to their services, but 
surely you would not require them to be so 
22Benjamin, Persia and the Persians , p. J61. 
23 rb· ---ll• ' p. 362. 
rude as to exclude visitors from their 
houses, or attendance from their services, 
for in the latter case, at least, they 
might sometimes make the mistake of exclu-
ding native Christians whom you allow to 
gather, for the garb and appearance of each 
are often similar. But if you do not want 
your people to attend these services4 prevent them in advance yourselves.2 
34 
Although the Persian government got assurance from the 
U.S. lVl inister that American missionaries would not deliberately 
proselytize lVioslems, Benjamin warned the missionaries to expect 
to encounter growing opposition, both secret and open from 
local government and religious leaders. The type of harrass~ 
ment experienced by one American missionary from local offi-
cials and mullahs was outlined in a letter written by mission-
aries in the city of Hamadan to Mr. Benjamin in February, 1884, 
in which they cited the unjustifiable arrest, ill-treatment, 
and fining of their Persian servants. 25 As a result of this 
letter, Benjamin protested to the iVi inister of Foreign Affairs 
that the Hamadan authorities had ignored the rights of Ameri-
can citizens and held American property, contrary to the 
Treaty of Turkomanchai. The Minister immediately issued orders 
for the return of the American property and cessation of fur-
ther harrassment of U.S. citizens. Opposition from local 
authorities toward the missionaries temporarily ceased. 
Benjamin cited the action of the Persian government as an 
24 · Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 81 dated 
August 15, 1884. 
25Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 57 dated 
Feb. 15, 1884, Encl. 2/57 written by James W. Hawkes dated 
Feb. 1, 1884. 
indication of their sincere desire to maintain friendship 
between the two countries and their intention to prot ect 
foreign citizens residing in their territory. 26 
35 
The Russian and French Ministers in Persia were concerned 
over both the Protestant and Catholic missionaries' overzealous 
attitude regarding proselytizing non-Christians. These 
Ministers enjo ined the missionaries to act with great restraint 
especially during the holy month of Ramadan. Benjamin observed 
that the "Persians are excitable people likely to allow their 
impulses to carry them to violence sufficiently regrettable 
at times. They are quarrelsome and when their fanaticism is 
aroused, may prove dangerous •.•• 1127 
In the performance of his primary responsibili t y of 
protecting American missionaries, compounded by a growing 
obsession with Russian designs on Persia, Benjamin was led 
into a confrontation with the Russian Minister in Teheran. 
The immediate cause was the receipt of a letter from Rev. 
Benjamin Labaree, earlier identified as having had a role in 
the original decis i on to open the Embassy, stating that t he 
Russian authorities within Persia were encouraging Armenian 
Orthodox, as well as the Persian, authorities to protest 
the proselytizing activities by the missi onaries. Benjamin 
viewed these protests as calculated to restrict American 
26 Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 274 dated 
August 19, 1884. 
28Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 81 da ted 
August 15, 1884. 
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influence in Persia, 28 and he added that every move by Ameri-
cans in Persia was "watched with a jealous eye by Russia. 1129 
As a result of receiving reports from the missionaries regard-
ing the Russians inducing the Jllloslems to protest the American 
presence, he despatched a note in English t o the Russian 
Minister in Teheran protesting these actions. The Russians 
returned it declaring that they could not understand English; 
French was the language normally used in notes of this kind 
sent to non-English legations i n Teheran.30 The standing 
policy of the Secretary of State, and the State Department as 
a whole, di d not support any aggressive action of its mini-
sters abroad. Frelinghuysen's policy was "the traditional 
one of opportunistic drifting and negativism--of not going 
out to look for trouble but settling troubles when they arose. 1131 
The Department rebuked Benjamin for his actions and instructed 
him henceforth to send directly to the Persian government his 
protests regarding the treatment of Americans in Persia and 
not to the Russian legation; a French translation should 
accompany any notes sent to the Russians.3 2 
28Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 103 dated 
lVlarch 23, 1884 and Benjamin, Persia and the Pers i ans, p. 433. 
29Despatch from U.S. iv1inister, Dip. Ser. No. 102 dated 
Mar. 19, 1883. 
30nespatch from U.S. r'1inister, Dip. Ser. No. 52 dated 
Jan • 1 9 , 18 8 3 • 
31P. M. Brown, "Frederick T. Frelinghuysen," in Secretaries 
of State. Samuel F. Bemis, ed. VIII, (Boston, 1928), J -;6 . 
32r ns tructions from State Department to U.S. Minister 
da te d May 17 and May 31, 1884. 
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Benjamin's precipitousness resulted in a second incident 
involving a foreign legation in Teheran. When the new German 
Minister, Herr von Braunschweig, took up residence in the 
Persian capital, he failed to call on Benjamin's wife on her 
day to receive official visitors. He immediately despatched 
a sharply-worded note to the German Legation stating, "Permit 
me to hope that an explanation without delay and (as far as 
possible) reparation on the part of those representing the 
German Empire at Teheran will prevent the conclusion that 
there is any definite intention of wanting respect towards 
the United States Government. 1133 The German reply was swift 
in coming and pointed ; t h e German Mini ster wa s "of the opin-
ion that neither his official position nor his personal 
d . . t h. t t h · · · ,.34 1gn1 y allow im o a ccep sue insulting expression. 
The State Department felt that Benjamin overreacted and 
created an international incident over a relatively minor 
affair. In support of his position, the foreign community 
in Teheran, being small, and the Persian characteristic of 
insis t i ng, incidentally, on correct ceremony and protocol, 
all knew of the German lVlinister 's slight of the U.S. Minister's 
wife. Benjamin reassured the State Department that he realized 
that von Braunschweig was just rec ently promoted from a simple 
consul to minister and was perhaps overcome with his new 
33Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 95 dated 
Dec. 30, 1884, Encl. 1/95 written by Benjamin to German Consu-
late, dated Dec. 22, 1884. 
34 Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 95 dated 
Dec. 30, 1884. 
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elevated position and persuaded that a Minister Resident, such 
as Benjamin, was beneath his dignity. For this reason, Benja-
min should have minimized the slight affront to his offices 
and to the U.S. He did not believe that it was the German 
government's policy to offend the American government, nor 
did h e feel that Count Bismarck would condone the conduct of 
his 1ninister in Teheran. 35 All attempts made by the Austrian 
and British ministers to reconcile the two parties proved 
unsuccessful. The British a mbassador was very supportive of 
Benjamin's action and acted as his advisor during this period. 
All conciliatory advances made by Benjamin were refused by 
the German minist er; the Briti sh minister finally advised 
Benjamin no t to make any further concession or attempt a 
reconciliation. It was noted that even the Austrian minister's 
attitude was one of sympathy for Benjamin's position, a feeling 
held by other members of the diplomatic corps in Teheran.36 
The U.S. State Department's attitude was unsympathetic 
toward its representative in Teheran, however, and the Depart-
ment did not hesitate to display its irritation with him for 
allowing a minor incident to develop into an exchange of 
notes between the two governments. 'fhey also rebuked him 
for the sharpness of his note to the German minister. It is 
very likely that this incident eventually led to his replace-
ment when the new American President, Grover Cleveland, took 
35Benjamin, Persia and the Persians, p. 435. 
36Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 95 dated 
Dec. JO, 1884. 
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office in March of 1885. 
The strained relations between the German and American 
ministers eventually eased as is shown in the following inci-
dent. On an occasion when Benjamin's wife was on a drive in 
the country in March shortly before his departure in 1885, her 
carriage met with a mishap. Fortunately the German minister 
passed by on the road, and for the first time, acknowledged 
Benjamin's wife. He offered her his carriage for her return 
to the city. An exchange of notes between the two legations 
ended with the establishment of harmony between the ministers. 
Benjamin did not attribute the sudden change in these relations 
to the fact that he was scheduled to depart soon, because he 
had kept his plans a secret within the American Legation 
until shortly before his actual departure date.37 
Despite the displeasure of the State Department with 
Benjamin on several occasions, attributable to his impulsive 
and somewhat undiplomatic actions, he did receive occasional 
compliments from his superiors. The Minister was given credit 
by the Department, as well as by American missionaries, for 
the manner in which he protected them in Persia. As the 
result of his efforts and advice, the department agreed to 
establish consulates in Tabriz and Bushahr. Tabriz was the 
center of much missionary activity. Prior to the establish-
ment of a U.S. consulate in that city, the French and British 
Consulates looked after American interests; they had assumed 
37Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 109 dated 
April 10, 1885. 
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this responsibility even while Benjamin was in Teheran. 38 
Tabriz and Bushahr were both ports of entry for foreign goods. 
Trade from the United States, Europe, and Russia was channeled 
through Tabriz, while cargo arriving by sea was shipped through 
the southern port of Bushahr. 
Benjamin's other principle achievement was the establish-
ment of friendly relations with the Shah and his ministers. 
The Persians seemed to like him, and he encouraged the Shah 
to open a legation in Washing.:ton. 39 The prospect of receiving 
a representative from Persia in Washington was not welcomed 
with enthusiasm back home, and it was delayed for four years. 
The recall of Benjamin occurred when the Democratic Party 
took office in March 1885 although he actually left Teheran 
on May 13. After his departure, the responsibility of protect-
ing American interests in the country was assumed a gain by the 
British ambassador. Benjamin was not immediately succeeded by 
the new American minister. He later insisted that it was a 
disgrace for the U.S. government to "abandon the permanent and 
growing colony of its citizens in Persia to the protection of 
the legation of another power, even t hough friendly. 1140 The 
difficulty that developed b etween Benjamin and the State 
Department really evolved from their differing views of the 
38Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 99 dated 
Jan. 17, 1885. 
39Ibid. , Dip. Ser. No. 99 dated Jan. 17, 1885. 
40Ibid., Dip. Ser. No. 58 dated Feb. 21, 1883. 
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role of the U.S. minister in Persia. He felt that he was the 
representative of a great power desiring to open full diplo-
matic and economic relations and to expand the power, prestige, 
and commerce of the U.S. with Persia; the President and the 
Department of State rather were persuaded that the U.S. repre-
sentative should play only a limited role there, mainly, that 
of protecting missionaries and otherwise keeping a low profile, 
avoiding problems and not involving the U.S. government in the 
affairs of other nations. This difference in approach resulted 
in disappointment on both sides. 41 
It is interesting to note Benjamin's observations in 
1885 on the causes for Persian difficulty in emerging as a 
modern nation. The first cause he mentioned is religion. A 
state religion had restricted the development of the country, 
and he emphasized the seriousness of having the government 
and its laws subject to the dictates of the clergy. The 
second cause of weakness within Persia was the pervasive 
corruption of those in power. The third cause was the con-
tinuous rivalry between England and Russia and the constant 
threat of actual interference by Russia in the internal 
In modern times, the United States has 
replaced England, but the struggle between East and West 
over the destiny of Persia continues. 
41B · · P . a d th P . 433 d L tt enJamin, ers1 an e ersians, p. an e er 
to Department dated January 12, 1887. 
42B · · P . d t ·he P . enJamin, ersia an ers1ans, pp. 473-475-
CHAPTER III 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS, 1885-1903 
The post of American Minister in Teheran remained vacant 
after Benjamin's departure on May 19, 1885, until April 2 of 
the next year when Frederick Hampden Winston took over the 
responsibility. The United States continued to maintain its 
position of protecting American interests in Persia, but was 
determined not to become embroiled in the internal affairs of 
Persia, nor in the political intrigues between the western 
powers over influence in the country. 
The American position of non-involvement in Persia was 
emphasized by President Grover Cleveland, head of the first 
Democratic administration since the Civil . War, in his inaugu-
ral address on March 4, 1885, "It is the policy of neutrality, 
rejecting any share in foreign broils and ambitions upon other 
continents and repelling their intrusion here. It is the 
policy of Monroe and of Washington and Jefferson--'Peace, 
commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling 
alliance with none. 1111 Both the President and his Secretary 
of State were determined to remain aloof from becoming involved 
in strengthening Persia's ability to remain free of economic 
or political domination by her neighbor, Russia, or other 
industrial nations of Europe. 
A new minister for Persia was eventually selected by 
Secretary of State Thomas F. Bayard in January 1886. He 
1Richardson, !lessages of Presidents, p. 4886. 
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designated Winston, who was born in Sand Hill, Liberty County, 
Georgia, and was practicing law in Chicago at the time of his 
appointment. 2 The lack of urgency exhibited by the U.S. 
State Department in its slow replacement of the American 
minister in Persia is an indication of the degree of impor-
tance placed by the U.S. on its relations not only in Persia, 
but in the entire Middle East during the late nineteenth 
century. 
lVir. Winston left the United States on January 16, 1886, 
and after the usual annoyances encountered in travelling in 
that part of the world--luggage being misplaced, wettings in 
the driving rain, snowdrifts up to six feet deep, and burning 
sun which blistered his face--he finally reached Teheran on 
April 2. In his audience with the Shah, the ruler indicated 
his continued interest in visiting the United States by his 
detailed questions concerning the voyage across the Atlantic 
Ocean. He also showed his interest in seeing Niagara Falls. 3 
Winston's stay in Persia was a rather abbreviated one; 
he tendered his resignation two months after arriving in 
P . 4 ersia. He saw no reason for America to maintain a legation 
there because there was insufficient commerce between the two 
countries to warrant the expense of running a legation. 
"There is no American trade worth mentioning and no prospect 
2 Leonard, Who's Who in America, 1899-1900 (Chicago, 1916), 
p. 807. 
3Despatch from U.S. Minister, Role 2, August 17, 1885-
June JO, 1887, Dip. Ser. No. 8 dated April 5, 1886. 
4Ibid., Dip. Ser. No. 17 dated May 10, 1886. 
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for any •••• The insecurity of property, the inefficiency of 
authority, the constantly increasing depreciation of currency 
and a multitude of other reasons make it inadvisable in my 
judgment to try to extend American trade in the country."5 
Winston also believed that a threat to American mission-
aries working in Persia did not exist so long as they did not 
attempt to convert Moslems to Christianity. There were only 
twenty American missionaries in Persia in 1886. Winston 
observed that the Persian people's attitude toward American 
· · · f t 1 t· 6 missionaries was one o o era ion. His strong feeling 
concerning the lack of trade opportunities in Persia was held 
in spi t e of an i ntervi ew that he had with the Shah who expressed 
his interest in trade potential that could develop between t he 
two nations. The Shah cited one of his pet projects--he pro-
posed that American technological and financial resourc es 
should be used to construct a railroad line between the Per-
sian seaport on the Persian Gulf and the city of Teheran. 
This would connect the southern portion of Persia with the 
northern part of the country. The project had been opposed by 
both Great Britain and Russia for their own reasons, and Persia 
had been reluctant to grant construction rights to any other 
European country for they would assuredly demand a high 
5Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 17 dated 
May 10, 1886 and Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 32. 
6 Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip . Ser. No. 14 dated 
April 10, 1886. 
price for their investment. 7 
Soon after setting foot on Persian soil, Winston became 
disillusioned with the Persians. He reported to the State 
Department in one of his despatches that the presents and 
gifts which he had to pay to various Persians while travelling 
from the Caspian seaport to Teheran included gifts to the 
Governor, interpreter, commander of the Shah's yacht, engineer 
of the roads, postmaster, Precinct Chief of Police, guards, 
villagers, and servants. His expenses for these gifts 
amounted to $527.70. He observed that the poor pay all the 
taxes and the noblemen, nothing. Public offices were sold to 
the highest bidder. Manufacturing was at a low ebb. Further, 
he reported, Russia was already in a strong position, politi-
cally, and economically, within the country. 8 
It was Winston's conclusion that nothing justified main-
taining a U.S. mission in Teheran. It was for this reason, 
and his personal business back in the United States, that he 
submitted his resignation to the Department of State, effective 
June 30, 1886. In his letter of res.ignation, he stated that 
7Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 15 dated 
April 25, 1886. This railline was finally constructed in 
1930, financed from funds derived from taxes on tea and sugar 
and through the use of American and German engineering firms 
and a Scandinavian construction concern. The line, known as 
the Trans Iranian Railway, was completed in 1938, in time for 
use by the Allies in shipping critically-needed supplies to 
Russia during World War II, as described in The Modernization 
of Iran, Amin Banani (Stanford: University of California, 1961), 
p. 134. 
8 Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 14 dated 
April 20, 1886. 
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he was refusing to accept compensation for services which he 
. h 9 could not accomplis • 
After Winston's departure from Teheran on June 10, the 
American charge d'affaires, A. Keim, a Persian national, took 
charge of the American interests in Persia. Charges against 
him made by the Persian government to the State Department, 
however, forced them to relieve him of his responsibilities 
and, once again, the U.S. had to turn to the British charge 
d'affaires for the oversight of American interests. 10 
E. Spencer Pratt of Alabama accepted the appointment to 
the post of Minister Resident and Consul General in Teheran 
on August 13, 1886. He assumed his duties in Teheran on 
November 22. The Shah asked for a photograph of the U.S. 
President and Mrs. Cleveland, having previously asked Winston 
. th . . . t l l wi out receiving i • 
Pratt's assessment of Persia was in stark contrast to 
that of Winston. Pratt was full of praise for the country 
and recognized the economic, political, and investment possi-
bilities for American capitalists there. Throughout his few 
years' stay in Persia, he constantly endeavored to foster 
Persian-American relations and increasing trade and investment 
possibilities. All his efforts to influence the opinion of 
9Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 17 dated 
May 10, 1886. 
lOibid., Dip. Ser. No. 35 dated Aug. 12, 1886. 
11Ibid., Dip. Ser. No. 8 dated Nov. 25, 1886. 
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the State Department were rebuffed by his superiors. 12 
The Shah continued his effort to enlist American support 
in the development of his country. A private interview with 
Pratt emphasized Persian natural resources and concessions, 
and his desire to obtain both American capital and technical 
knowledge to develop his country. The Shah had been impressed 
with American integrity as displayed by American missionaries, 
doctors, and teachers. He was also aware that America had no 
imperialistic designs on his country and Persia might use 
America to counterbalance both the economic and political 
pressure from England and Russia. 13 
In another i nt erview with the Shah, Pratt reported the 
Shah's comments regarding Persia's vast mineral resources and 
the fertility of its soil which required only an improved 
irrigation system. "The field is opened to American capital 
. . t "14 and industry, which have but to come here and reap its frui s. 
The Shah promised extraordinary concessions to American capi-
talists if they would assist in industrial or agricultural 
projects. He also expressed his desires that the United 
States government raise the level of its representation in 
. h t d f ·t d. · · l5 Teheran to the hig es gra e o is iplomatic service. 
12Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, P• 33 ■ 
l3Peter Avery, Modern Iran (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1967), 
p. 145. 
14Despatch from u.s. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 9 dated 
Nov. 29, 1886. 
15Ibid. 
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Secretary of State Bayard's only action after receipt of 
this despatch was to forward it to the Chairm~n of the Comrai t --: 
tees on Foreign Relations for the Senate and on Foreign 
Affairs for the House of Representatives for their information. 
During 1887, the Shah gave permission for the erection of 
a hospital in Teheran under the direction of Dr. W.W. Torrence, 
missionary-physician of the American Presbyterian Board. The 
land for the hospital was donated by the Prime Minister in 
payment of medical services performed by Dr. Torrence on the 
Prime Minister and construction money was received from an 
American woman as well as from the Presbyterian Board. Pratt 
wanted the Department to bring this event to the attention of 
the American public for purposes of gaining further assistance 
for the American missionaries in Persia. The Department fur-
nished this information to the press, accordingly. 
Pratt spoke very highly of the work of the American mis-
sionaries in elevating and educating native Christian elements 
as well as their medical work and "also by the beneficial 
16 
moral effort of their example upon the community generally." 
He used many techniques to interest his superiors in Washing-
ton and the business community in becoming more involved in 
the economic aspects of Persia. Indeed he was a&nonished by 
the State Department for acting as an agent for the Gatling 
Gun Company and again two months later, the Department warned 
him that he should not act as salesman or agent for any 
16Despatch from U.S. Minister, Roll #J, July 3, 1887 to 
May 31, 1881, Dip. Ser. No. 114 dated Sept. 20, 1887. 
49 
American citizens involved in commercial ventures overseas. 
Both the Shah and various of his ministers continued to dis-
cuss the feasibility of obtaining American capital, American 
technicians, mining engineers and geologists, and American 
business to assist the country in furthering its development. 
All of these requests were forwarded by Pratt to the State 
Department. Secretary Bayard patiently advised Pratt of the 
many difficulties surrounding investments in Persia, that 
investments could more profitably be made closer to home, and 
that the policy of the United States was one of non-interventior. 
The one and only common venture that materialized during 
Pratt's stay in Persia was made by Francis H. Clerque of 
Bangor, Maine, who sought concessions to build a railroad and 
develop an industrial empire. A sixty-year concession was 
obtained by Clerque, with the active help of Pratt, which 
granted him general electric rights. Because of a shortage 
of funds, the Company never implemented the concession and the 
project eventually died. 18 
Another scheme of Pratt's to get America interested in 
Persia was a proposal for the establishment of an Oriental 
institute to make Americans more aware of the Middle East. 
He also suggested that the United States invite the Shah to 
visit during the Shah's tour of Europe. All suggestions were 
rejectect. 19 
17Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 35. 
18lli.Q., P• 37. 
19rbid., pp. 35 and 37. 
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Pratt's major achievement during his five years in Persia 
was the completion of negotiations for having a Persian repre-
sentative in Washington. The Shah decided to send a career 
diplomat, Haji Hosein Kuli Khan 1V1o'tamed-ol-Vezareh, and 
assigned him as Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary 
to Washington. 2O In spite of Pratt's request to the Department 
that i t give t he Persian an elaborate welcoming ceremony, the 
State Department arrangements were of a modest nature. 21 The 
Persian minister arrived in Washington on October 5, 1888. He 
had the opportunity during his first meeting with President 
Cleveland to present the Persian government's plea for Ameri-
can a id to sav e Persia from British and Russian domination. 22 
This transported the quest i on of whether or not to help Persia 
from distant Teheran to Penns ylvania Avenue. 
With regard to the primary reason for Pratt's assignment 
in Persia, the protection of American life and property, the 
missionaries' life there had settled down to the usual harass-
ment and threats. The threat continued to be felt by Nesto-
rian Christians in western Persia. The Kurds from Ottoman 
areas were still the threat. On Augus t 28 , 1888, Prat noti-
fied the State Department that the Kurds living in the Ottoman 
of the United States • Diplomatic 
~.::..:::..:=.1"?:.:....:;,;.=:.:.-'""7"i=;';8=i"i8~,----=N:-o--.~2:-::5:t:=-::d--a-:=::t'--e"='d-=-J'="u-l==-'y~~~8 8 . 
21 rbid., No. 252 dated Jan. 23, 1888 and No. 144 dated 
Oct. 4, 1888. 
22 Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 39, 
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Empire were planning to enter Persia and attack the Christians. 23 
On a more prosaic level, local Tabriz officials planted obsta-
cles in the path of American missionaries attempting to purchase 
land to construct a new school. Also, Pratt reported in June 
1887 that the American citizens were robbed and assaulted in 
an area of Persia contiguous to the Otto~nan border. 24 In 
spite of their need for protection and these niggling annoy-
ances and threats, the lives of missionaries were rather 
routine during this period. President Benjamin Harrison 
ex.pressed the satisfaction 0£ the U.S. government over the 
"generous treatment" accorded them in Persia , 25 
The one serious instance tha t ma rred the relationship 
between the Persians and American missionar i es was the £ata l 
stabbing o£ the wif e 0£ Rev. J.N. Wright who lived in the 
district o£ Salmas in western Persia. Mrs. Wright was a native 
Persian Nestorian, having been married to Rev, Wright for at 
least five years. 26 She had been attacked and stabbed by an 
Armenian who was eventually arrested in Ottoman territory and 
returned to prison in Persia. 27 Pratt requested the assistance 
23For eign Relations, No. 347 dated April 17, 1889, p. 644. 
24 Ibid. and No. 365 dated June 18, 1889, pp. 645-646. 
25Richardson, Messages of Presidents, p. 783. 
26Foreign Relations, No. 456 dated May 24, 1890, pp. 658-
659. 
27 Ibid., No. 457, dated May 16, 1890, p. 660. 
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of the British consul general at Tabriz, Col. C.E. Stewart, 
through the British minister in Teheran to represent the U.S. 
officially in this case. This is evidence that, in spite of the 
American representative in Teheran, the United States Govern-
ment still had to depend on friendly relations with Great 
Britain for the protection of its citizens in at least some of 
the outlying areas of the country. The fatal assault on Mrs. 
Wright had no religious overtones, but was a domestic affair 
between the Wrights and the Armenian, a teacher in the school 
operated by the missionaries. After the usual vacillation of 
local officials, Mrs. Wright's assassin was brought to trial 
in Tabriz. The minutes of the trial were forwarded to Teheran 
for review by the Prime Minister where it was decided that 
execution was not warranted. The attacker received a sentence 
of life imprisonment from which he ultimately escaped. The 
Acting Secretary of State, William F. Wharton, informed Pratt 
that the U.S. Government would not insist on the death penalty, 
even though Persian justice would not be adequate punishment 
for the murder. 28 The United States also did not pursue the 
matter because f/lrS • Wright was a Persian by birth and the U.S. 
lacked a means of exerting any effective force on . 29 Persia. 
On July 15, 1891, a new American minister, Truxton Beale, 
arrived in Teheran to replace Pratt. It was a great shock to 
Pratt when he was notified by the State Department that he 
28Foreign Relations, No. 233, dated Sept. 19, 1891, P• 691. 
29Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 42. 
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was being replaced. "The reluctant minister was practically 
evicted. 1130 During his stopover in Athens, Beale received a 
telegram from Pratt on June 21 requesting him to remain in 
Athens until a further communication was sent. Beale replied 
the next day that he was sailing immediately for Constantinople. 
Again on June 28, Beale received a note from Pratt saying he 
should go by way of Tabriz and thence to Teheran because of 
unhealthy conditions on the Caspian coast. Once again, the 
next day, Pratt advised Beale to delay his entrance into 
Persia as a consequence of the absence of the Shah from Teheran 
for forty days. Beale returned Pratt's message with the nota-
tion that he had no fear of fever, and he was travelling via 
Baku and Rescht intending to reach Teheran on July 14, 31 
When in Teheran, Beale was notified infonnally that Pratt 
had secured an appointment as commissioner general in charge 
of the Persian exhibit at the World's Columbian Exhibition 
which was to be held in Chicago in 1893--a position without 
pay or diplomatic responsibility. Beale graciously supported 
this appointment in his despatch to Washington: "Pratt's 
extensive connections make it difficult to find a better 
qualified person to carry out such an assignment. 11 32 
30Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 43. 
31Despatch from U.S. Minister, Roll #5, Jan. 2, 1890 to 
Dec. 5, 1892, Dip. Ser. No. 525 dated July 25, 1891 and 
Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 43. 
32Ibid., Dip. Ser. No. 8 dated July 23, 1891. 
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Yet another shift in the general attitude of the Ameri-
can minister took place with Beale. Benjamin had been most 
enthusiastic about Persia, Winston's disillusionment caused 
him to leave in two months, Pratt waxed enthusiastic about 
the economic potential of Persia, and now at the outset, Beale 
showed little enthusiasm or interest in encouraging capital 
investments.33 Despite the fluctuation of attitudes of the 
various American ministers in Persia, that of the State 
Department remained one of non-involvement and negative 
reaction to even the slightest hint of becoming connected to 
the economic or political affairs of the Persians. 
Although Beale's tour in Persia was relatively short, he 
achieved, through negotiation with the Shah, an agreement 
that the Persian government would permit American missionaries 
to hold real estate. He persuaded the Shah to promulgate a 
law permitting them to hold property in their own right, instead 
of according to the previous practice of their listing the 
property in the name of a Persian subject. Beale succeeded 
in winning this concession by emphasizing the "good character, 
h . t d t. 1 k d b th · · · 11 3 
4 
ospi al and e uca iona wor one y e missionaries. 
In addition, he instituted the practice of obtaining the seal 
of the Grand Vizier on each deed of property purchased by 
Americans, guaranteeing the rights of the missionaries to hold 
J3Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic RelationsL p. 41. 
34Foreign Relations, No. 26 dated Dec. 5, 1891, p. 355 ■ 
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the property • .35 The inability of the missionaries to have 
property in their own names had been a source of dissatisfac-
tion between the Persians and the missionaries; the missiona-
ries were grateful for Beale's significant achievement. 
Two major events occurred in Persia during this period. 
The first was the major protest and open resistance to the 
Shah over the granting of a tobacco monopoly to the British 
Imperial Tobacco Corporation. The Persian people, led by the 
religious leaders, organized a mass movement declaring that 
the tobacco was unclean, since it was now being processed by 
Christians, and they forbade smoking until the Shah cancelled 
the monopoly. The mullah claimed the growth or sale of tobacco 
in Persia by foreigners was against the Koran and Islam. 
Tobacco was universally used in the country at this time and 
practically a necessity for Persians; however, the protes t 
was so successful that no Persian dared to smoke in p·ublic. 
The Shah was forced to cancel the concession and the alliance 
between mullah, reformers, and discontented population won an 
important victory. 36 
Beale was impressed with the power of the mullah. He 
explained in a despatch to the Department that "A mullah is 
simply a priest and not a member of any organization like the 
Church of England, ••• but by common consent a body of them 
.35Foreign Relations, No. 26 dated Dec. 5, 1891, p . .355 . 
.3 6Nikki R. Keddi, Religion and Reb ellion in Irani The 
Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London, 1966), pp. 1-29. 
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came together, carried on negotiations and correspondence with 
the Shah, made demands and concessions and concluded an under-
standing with him, 1137 He felt that the protective organiza-
tion of the mullah mush have been the work of the Russians 
by "provoking antiforeign demonstrations in order to impede 
the development of Persia by Western enterprise, 1138 
Beale's sudden decision to resign and depart from Persia 
was hastened by a cholera epidemic in the winter of 1892, 
Again, the post in Teheran was left vacant, after only one year, 
The attitude of the State Department regarding the vacancy 
and the country of Persia was again made unambiguously clear 
in a letter from Secretary John W. Foster appointing Watson R. 
Sperry to the position, "We are now without any representa-
tive in Teheran, and while the necessities of the Government 
are not very great, there might be some inconvenience to 
American residents in that country in having the post remain 
vacant a great while, 1139 
Sperry served in Teheran only eight months, but during 
that short period, he became involved in problems of harass-
ment of American missionaries in the major Persian city of 
Tabriz. These missionaries were forced again to turn to the 
local British official for protection and the British Govern-
ment was not eager to play too active a role since they did 
37Foreign Relations, No, JO dated June 11, 1891, p. 357, 
38Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 43, 
39rb· --lJ!. ' p. 46. 
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not want to give the Russians any pretext to exploit Persia's 
religious fanaticism. It was Sperry's action that resulted 
in the appointment of a consul to Tabriz whose main purpose 
would be to protect the missionaries. 
A recent closing of a school and church in Tabriz provoked 
the State ,Department to request Sperry to press a claim for 
40 the losses suffered. He realized the weakness of the Ameri-
can presence and its inability to protect the missionaries; 
therefore, he suggested that the State Department should show 
the Persian government the extent of its seriousness by demon-
strating visibly the power of the United States, perhaps by 
sending a warship to the Persian Gulf. Of course, the State 
Department decided against such a display and did not prose-
t th . 41 cue e claim. 
Sperry's successor, Alexander McDonald, received his 
appointment on September 3, 1883 and held it for four years. 
He was enthusiastic about Persia, much in the manner of Pratt; 
however, McDonald's tour was marked by increasing unrest and 
lawlessness in the country. The Shah's power was weakened as 
the result of his backing down during the Tobacco Protest, and 
McDonald's role of protecting American citizens and property 
became increasingly important. In an attempt to have a thief 
40Despatch from U.S. Minister, Roll # 6, July 28, 1892 to 
August 29, 1894, Dip. Ser . No. 50 dated May 29, 1893. 
' 41 Foreign Relations, No. 13 dated Jan. 25, 1893. 
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punished for having robbed an American missionary, McDonald 
remarked, "The administration of justice in Persia is most 
peculiar-- 0 how to do it' seeming to be their aim. By a system 
of delays, annoyances, and pecuniary demands parties accused 
and accusing are subjected to such vexations as to yield in 
hopeless despair of having justice done them. It is this 
state of things that I am seeking to overcome in this case in 
point •••• 1142 
The inability or unwillingness of the central government 
to enforce the laws of the land in even the major cities of 
Persia during these years created increasing difficulties for 
Christian, Persian, and American missionaries. The exalted 
position of the mullah in the society and the weakness of the 
Shah enabled the mullah to defy local government authority at 
wi11. 43 A request by Rev. James W. Hawkes to McDonald to 
intervene in his behalf with the government in Teheran for 
permission to open a school in Kermanshah, which was previously 
refused by the governor of the province, was forwarded to the 
Shah. The Christian community there consisted of about six 
to eight families, almost all of whom were Catholic, while 
the Jewish families numbered about four hundred. It was from 
these groups of families that Mr. Hawkes planned to draw his 
42Despatch from U.S. Minister, Dip. Ser. No. 6 dated 
June 21, 1893 and No. 7 dated Oct. 19, 1893. 
43Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 45. 
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pupils. 44 The Shah rejected the request,. citing the distance 
of Kermanshah from the capital, the turbulent and fanatical 
character of the people and the tribes in the neighborhood, 
and pressure from religious leaders. The safety and welfare 
of the property and individuals as well as the state were the 
factors that forced the Shah to decide on the inadvisability 
of opening the school at that time. These matters were reported 
to the State Department by the minister. 45 
Mr. Hawkes was a missionary:· in Hamadan while he was 
trying to start a school in Kermanshah. He reported that the 
local akhund, rriullah Abdullah, a local ecclesiastical leader, 
was behind th e r en ewa l of pers ecution of Jews in Hamadan and 
was instrumental in stirring up resistance against establish-
ing the school in Kermanshah. He was described by John Tyler, 
Vice Consul General in charge. of the U.S. l egation in Teheran 
as a "violent bigot and fanatic and this phase of his character, 
in the eyes of the common people, throws a halo of sanctity 
around his persona" 46 
Popular unrest occurred t hroughout Persia, all of which 
was symbolic of the degree of decay t hat existed in the country 
and the failure of the central authority "to cope effectively 
P• 49~~Foreign Relations , No. 1.33 dated Jan, 28, 1894, Encl. 1., 
45Ibid., No. 108 . dated June 18, 1894, p. 491. 
46Ibid., No. 11.3 dated July 12, 1894, p. 49.3. 
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with any demonstration against its authority. 1147 These condi-
tions were reported to the U.S. State Department, but Secretary 
of State W.Q. Gresham could not comprehend the reason Persia 
was unable to provide "due protection11 •48 
The main center of cancer for the American minister was in 
northwestern Persia and the area border.ing :the Ottomans, where 
nomadic Kurds were massacring Christians there in the vicinity 
of Lake Van. American missionaries first carried the knowledge 
of the disorders to Persia. McDonald reported to Secretary of 
State Richard Olney of the fears existing around the mission 
stations in Tabriz, Khoi, Urmia, and Salmas--all in Azerbaijan 
Prov i nce--concerning incursions from across the border or native 
outbreaks. They were also nervous ov er hearing loca l mullah 
saying that they must naturally s ide with the Ottomans. 49 1'he 
success of the Kurds in massacring and plundering Christians had 
excited some lVloslems in Persia, who joined the plundering; the 
bazaars in the r egion of Tabriz were f illed with plunder. The 
American minister tried to enlist the other western nations in 
action in case of riots in T eheran but to no avail. 1V1issiona-
ries requested an armed guard to assist Armenians, Nestor ians, 
47Foreign Relations, No. 51 dated Mar. 29, 1894, p. 488. 
48rbid., Enclosure 1 in No. 122 dated Apr. 24, 1894, 
p. 498.-
49Ibid., No. 218 dated Dec. 14, 1895, p. 466. 
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and Jews trapped in Van to migrate to Persia. Both the 
Persian government and the U.S. Minister refused to take any 
action as it would constitute armed invasion of another 
country.50 The Secretary of State concurred in this, 51 and 
the Department continued to urge the Persian government to 
insure adequate protection of Christian lives. The government 
earnestly endeavored to extend protection to all people living 
in Persia; however, i t s police force was deficient and corrupt. 
Disturbances again broke out in Hamadan between the Moslems 
and the sizeable (3,000) Jewish population living in the city. 
Jews had lived there from biblical times and many had gained 
positions of wealth which excited the envy of their neighbors. 
Differences between the civil officials and mullah led to a 
breakdown of authority which resulted in disorder and other 
excesoos a gainst the Jews. Several American missionaries 
working in Hamadan at this time requested the U.S. Minister 
to intercede with the Persian government for the safety of 
the Jews.52 The action by the government finally brought 
peace and an orderly state of affairs to the city. These 
disorders and threats to the lives of non-Moslem groups con-
tinued to be the main concern of American diplomacy in a 
5°Foreign Relations, No. 224 dated Jan. 22, 1896, P• 469. 
51Ibid., No. 139 dated Mar. 3, 1896, p. 470. 
52Ib"d -L•, No. 260 dated Oct. 7' 1896, p. 482. 
62 
country wherein the U.S. had little political, strategic, or 
. 1. 1 t 53 commerc1a 1nvo vemen. 
The internal disorder and weakness of the central govern-
ment eventually led to the assassination of the Shah. On May 
1896, the Shah was visiting a shrine for devotion when a man 
disguised as a woman shot him in the heart.54 The new Shah, 
Muzaffar-ed-Din Shah, was proclaimed Shah on the same d~y. 
According to a report to the State Department, he employed 
as his personal physician, Dr. George W. Holmes, a member of 
the American Presbyterian Mission in Hamadan.55 
1, 
The new Shah issued a decree in January 1897 banning the 
importation of all books, both religious and secular. McDonald 
protested to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that this ruling 
was unjust to foreigners residing in Persia and contrary to 
the spirit of the times. 56 The Minister of Foreign Affairs 
replied that the restriction was only on sacred and religious 
books brought in for the purpose of free distribution to 
Persians for the propagation of an alien religion, and it had 
been issued to placate the populace which was being urged on 
53Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 49. 
54Foreign Relations, "Assassination of the Shah," Telegram 
from McDonald to Olney dated May 1, 1896, p. 488. 
55Ibid., No. 241 dated May 4, 1896, p. 488. 
56Ibid., No. 178 dated Jan. 25, 1897, p. 427. 
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by the mullahs.57 Like many other Persian laws during this 
era, McDonald noted that this one was not strictly enforced.58 
McDonald was replaced after the new Republican administra-
tion of President William McKinley had assumed office. McKin-
ley continued the Cleveland policy of non-intervention and no 
entanglement, although he insisted on protection of the national 
honor and the lawful rights of U.S. citizens throughout the 
world.59 McDonald's successor, Arthur S. Hardy, was appointed 
to the post on July 12, 1897 ■ He was a novelist, former edi-
tor of Cosmopolitan Magazine, and a mathematician, and was 
assuming his first diplomatic assignment. Hardy's chief 
concern in Teheran was the same as McDonald's--protection of 
the missionaries under disturbed conditions and a breakdown of 
effective 1aw and order in the country. 
Rev. Mehran Bagdasarian, a naturalized American citizen 
and a missionary for the Disciples of Christ, was arrested by 
Persian authorities and accused of protecting and helping 
Armenian revolutionists. In arresting him, the Persians 
violated the rights of an American citizen, and Hardy and Con-
sul General Tyler protested to the Persian government, although 
they felt little sympathy toward Bagdasarian. They considered 
57Foreign Relations, Enclosure 2 in No. 282 dated Feb. 20, 
1897, p. 429. 
58Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 50. 
59Ibid. 
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him to be a man who had sought _American naturalization in order 
to gain protection of the flag but thereafter one who evaded 
. t. h" 60 the duties of c1 1zens 1p. 
Although Hardy attempted to secure a policy statement from 
the State Department regarding action to be taken by the u.s. 
Minister in Persia in protecting these "pseudo-citizens" as 
well as native-born Americans, the Department could deny pro-
tection to any person returning to Persia after naturalization. 61 
Hardy became very disturbed over his inability to defend "bona 
fide" American citizens when mistreated. He noted that both 
Britain and Russia could resort to economic pressure to enforce 
their demands; whereas he could use only an argument and moral 
suasion. 62 The protest and action was , in the ca se of Bagda-
sarian, sufficient for the Persian government to release him 
and even force the governor of Azerbaijan to pay an indemnity 
of two hundred tomans to the Armenian. 63 Secretary of State 
John Hay agreed with Hardy's feeling on naturalized American 
citizens living abroad and the latter was authorized to 
refuse protection if, upon investigation, he was satisfied 
that the privilege of naturalization was being abused, 64 
6°Foreign Relations, No. 38 dated Aug. 8, 1898, p. 525. 
61Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 52. 
62Foreign Relations, No. 45 dated Dec. 21, 1898, p. 528. 
63Ibid. 
64rbid., No. 38, dated Feb. 2, 1899, p. 529. 
Hardy also developed strong feelings over Russia's role 
in northern Persia. A Russian mission of the Orthodox Church 
was operating in the north among the Armenians and Nestorians 
and was gradually displacing the Presbyterian and Roman Catho-
lic missionaries in that area. When asked by American mission-
aries for guidance, Hardy replied that as a consequence of the 
proximity of Russia and the feebleness of the Persian govern-
ment, it would be unwise to protest on the general ground that 
the Persian g0vernment was not in a position vigorously to 
maintain religious liberty. 65 
Hardy was replaced by Herbert W, Bowen on May 3, 1899. 
A career diplomat and the then publisher of a newspaper, The 
Independent, 66 he switched the legation outlook from one of 
defeatist pessimism to positive hopefulness. Some of his 
predecessors had backed down from efforts to stimulate Ameri-
can trade with Persia, to persuade the American government to 
move to greater involvement, and to curb Russian influence in 
Persia. Bowen took the offensive in all qf these areas, He 
adopted the idea expressed by President McKinley in his second 
inaugural address, "In this age of keen rivalry among nations 
for mastery in commerce, the doctrine of evolution and the 
rule of survival of the fittest must be as inexorable in these 
.506. 
65Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p • .53, 
66ivra1one, Dictionary of American Biography, II, pp • .50.5-
operations as they are positive in the results they bring 
about. 1167 The State Department could not dispute these 
66 
ideas of Bowen for they coincided with the Open Door Policy 
being pursued by the U.S. in China; however, such a precipitous 
change from previous policy and the distinct possibility of the 
U.S. becoming involved in Persia as it was now deeply interested 
elsewhere in the world resulted in a negative response from 
Washington. Bowen was urged not to provoke Russia by any 
action that might be considered unfriendly by that country. 68 
Through the application of the principles of the Open Door 
Policy, Bowen had hoped to contain the expansionist ideas 
and inf'luence of Russia within Persia. 69 He forced the State 
Department to consider the application of the China policy to 
Persia, but they backed off and disavowed his thrust. 
Bowen then tried to interest Britain and Germany in efforts 
to keep at least the southern part of Persia free from the 
Russian influence. He was concerned that Britain, once domi-
nant in Persia, was interested ·now only in keeping a purely 
commercial relation there. 7O His efforts and enthusiasm to 
secure the support of these European powers proved as futile 
67Richardson, Messages of Presidents, X, p. 143. 
68 Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 55. 
69Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with 
the Middle East, 1784-1975 (Metuchen, N,J., 1977), P• 42. 
7OGeorge Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-
1948 (Ithaca, 1949), p. 4. 
as his importunings of his own State Department, and, in 1901, 
he was replaced by Lloyd C. Griscom who reverted to the more 
traditional attitude of the U.S. toward Persia. 
At the turn of the century, the U.S.-Persian diplomatic 
relationship remained substantially unchanged from what it had 
been s ince its inauguration over fifteen years earlier. Ameri-
can ministers who had advocated more aggressive policies both 
in politi cal and economic spheres were ignored or instructed 
to tone down their enthusiasm. Nonethel ess these early years 
established the basis for the relationship between the two 
countries which survived until 1940. Both nations were on 
the v erge of ext ensiv e and dynamic experiences, the U.S. becom-
ing a world power with worldwide interest s and Persia sliding 
down the road of chaos and revolution preparatory to entering 
a new phas e of revival and reconstruction in the twentieth 
century. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE CLIMAX--THE LABAREE MURDER 
On March 8, 1904, Reverend Benjamin W. Labaree, an 
American missionary living in Urmia, was murdered by Kurdish 
tribesmen and religious fanatics in northern Persia. 1 This 
event was, "in a sense, the culmination of the first twenty 
years of diplomat ic relations between the two countries. 112 
It brought into focus some basic elements in United States-
Persian relations i the degree of influence of a special-
interest group--the missionaries--in shaping American foreign 
policy, and the weakness of the Shah's government in maintain-
ing p ea ce and security within Persia. 
The murderer of Labaree was one Mir Ghaffar, a sayyid 
(a lineal descendant of IY.lohammad). Richmond Pearson, the 
American minister to Persia at the time, realized the signi-
ficance of this fact and the difficulty that would surround 
the arrest and punishment of Ghaffar and his accomplices by 
the Persian government. The Shah decided that because of his 
ancestral background, Mir Ghaff ar would not be executed, as was 
hoped for by the missionaries, but t hat he would receive a 
sentence of life impris onment with the stipulation that no 
further action be taken so long as t h e Kurds in Urm i a main-
tained good behavior. The Persian government suggested a 
1Foreign Relations, No. 44 dated April 18, 1906, pp. 658-
659. 
2Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, p. 82. 
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payment to Labaree's widow of "Thirty thousand dollars cash 
gold • .,3 She agreed to these arrangements and Pearson consid-
ered the Persian government's decision a practical applica-
tion of the laws of common sense, which would guarantee security 
of rather than cause additional danger to Christians in that 
area. 4 On January 11, 1905, the United States Department of 
State informed Pearson that the Labaree murder case was closed;5 
even though the missionaries did not agree and had no intention 
of dismissing the matter so casually. The Department was 
delighted with this favorable turn of events which had once 
again avoided an untenable position for the United States in 
a part of the world where the country's national interest was 
minimal. 
In contrast to the decision of the State Department, the 
missionaries were greatly disturbed and protested against the 
terms of the settlement, in spite of the Persian government 
having met all conditions set forth by the American government. 
The American "missionaries complain and assert that the Bri-
tish Government renders them more assistance than does their 
own; ••• 116 was the description of the missionaries' attitude 
3Foreign Relations, No. 80 dated Sep. 21, 1904 encl. 
Telegram dated Dec. 28, 1904, p. 676. 
4Ibid., No. 113 dated April 20, 1905, p. 728. 
5Ibid., Telegram dated Jan. 11, 1905, p. 727. 
6Ibid., No. 121, dated Oct. 7 , 1905, p. 733. 
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as expressed by Pearson in his despatch to the State Department, 
They insisted that all Kurds involved in the Labaree murder 
should be tried and punished by death, and it was their intrans-
igence which ballooned the incident to international proportions. 
Some of the accomplices of Mir Ghaffar had escaped across the 
Ottoman border. In order that the Persian government comply 
with the request of the United States State Department that 
they be punished according to their guilt, the Persian govern-
ment had to mount an expeditionary force to cross the Ottoman 
border and capture them. This insistance by the missionaries 
for the Persian government to act and not to evade its respon-
sibility ma de Pears on suggest to the State Department that an 
American squadron be despatched to the Pers ian Gulf as a show 
of force in support of Ar11erican demands. The Department was 
reluctant to take this action, and did not consider it a 
suitable response to the dilemma that the missionaries had 
gotten the United States into both domestically where she was 
nudged by the Foreign Mission Board in New York City as well 
as in Persia, The new American Consul of Tabriz, William F. 
Doty was requested by the mis::,ionaries to accompany the Per-
sian forces into the Ottoman land in their pursuit of the Kurds. 
Border fighting broke out and resulted in an invasion of Persia 
by the Ottomans, which reportedly threatened the safety of some 
fourteen missionaries living in the area. Both the British 
and American ministers to the Ottoman Empire were asked by the 
United States State Department to i n+;ervene with the Ottomans 
to insure the lives and safety of missionaries in the area. 
71 
Ottoman forces occupied border areas of Persia, but as it 
turned out they did not threaten the safety of the missiona-
ries, nor did they even come into their area. 
Report from Consul General Tyler in Teheran, however, 
advised that the Persian government had used the escuse of the 
Labaree murder to redress a number of grievances against the 
Ottomans. The United States government rejected the Persian 
claim that the United States was to blame for Persia's defeat 
at the hands of the Ottomans. Ottoman troops, the Persians 
charged, had invaded their land, killed Persians, Armenians, 
and other Christians, and captured $100,000 worth of Persian 
equipment; the United States should repay Persia for the losses. 
The State Department flatly refused any responsibility for the 
invasion of Ottoman lands until the day they received a cable 
from Consul Doty boasting that he had encouraged the Persians 
to act against the Kurds and even to follow Persian forces into 
Ottoman territory. His only regret was that the Ottomans inter-
fered.6 He was reprimanded subsequently by the Department for 
taking action contrary to the best interests and one which 
might have embarassed the United States government. 
The United States finally disentangled itself from the 
controversial incident by informing its minister that the 
United States had relinquished its demand for immediate 
punishment of the accessories to the murder and the assurance 
of a trial of those who had escaped the country were they ever 
to return. With the death of the murderer from natural causes 
6Yeselson, Persian Diplomatic Relations, pp. 77-78. 
72 
while in prison and the Persian payment to Mrs. Labaree, the 
United States government considered that the maximum justice 
possible under Persian law had been achieved. 
This event in the diplomatic history of the two nations 
emphasized three important factors in relationships between 
the two countries during the late nineteenth century. Perhaps 
most important is the manner by which the physical presence 
of the missionaries living in Persia influenced United States 
f oreign policy. The second is the determination of the United 
States government to remain aloof from involvement in the 
internal affairs of other nations. The third is the position 
and chara cter of Persia itsel f --geographically, politically, 
and culturally. 
The missionaries' influence on the United States govern-
ment made both a positive and a negative contribution to the 
United States foreign policy. The negative effect was the 
shoving of a reluctant nation into the affairs of another coun-
try when that nation, the United States, had no overt interest 
i n the other--either commercially, or poli t i cally, or s trate-
gically. They demanded specia l treatment from the United 
States government and used British influence when the American 
power was insufficient to meet their needs. They· could be con-
sidered pampered and respectful only of the laws of God, which 
they sometimes interpreted in a manner most advantageous to 
their position. On the positive side, the missionaries forced 
their reluctant country to implicate herself in an area that was 
important to the world. Through their schools, hospitals, and 
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personal integrity, they established a foundation of trust, 
respect, and admiration between the U.S. and Persia that 
extends to the present day. There remain hospitals whose 
origins come from the missionaries ahd· a -i.1 enuBs- are named to 
honor the memory of those missionaries whom the Persian people 
had loved and admired.? 
The second factor was that the outlook of the Monroe 
Doctrine still survived in the late nineteenth century. 
Neither the people of the United States nor their government 
displayed any great interest in Persia, and it was only the 
power and influence of the friends of the missionaries that 
maneuvered Congress into opening formal diplomatic relations 
with one of the oldest nations in the world. Once that was 
accomplished, the United States government maintained only a 
passive interest there. It neither had the will, interest, 
nor physical power necessary to enforce its interests in that 
distant part of the world. It is this fact that made American 
missionaries look toward British diplomatic officials in Persia, 
on numerous occasions, for protection and guidance. Americ&.n 
ministers to Persia who became impressed with the peculiarities 
of the Persian situation, her vast economic potential and 
strategic importance, and the threat of the growth of Russian 
influence were either ignored or reprimanded by the Department 
of State for overzealousness and were reminded of the basis 
of United States foreign policy--that of non-intervention and 
7one of the main avenues in Teheran today is named Jordan, 
after the A1tierican missionary who founded Alborz College. 
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non-involvement in the affairs of Persia. Although the 
government sent ministers to Persia to protect United States 
citizens living there--mainly the missionaries--the ministers 
were unable to furnish that protection. Many of the mission-
aries vividly emphasized this fundamental fact. 
The third factor--the expectation of Persian authorities 
that the United States could somehow provide protective assis-
tance against Russian pressures--requires a detailed study of 
Perso-Russian relations for thorough understanding. It can 
be said that in the Persian's view this third factor was gen-
uine. They were unwilling to enlist the aid of other Euro-
pean na tions, but saw the United States as a country of great 
strength and having no vested designs of acquiring power 
within Persia. The Persians wooed Americans in a manner simi-
lar to that of the suitor wooing his lady. All of Pers ia's 
advances were rejected by the United States. The Department 
of State displayed no interest in fostering trade with or 
investments in Persia. The United States ministers who became 
enthusiastic over the potential weal t h of Persia were i gnored 
and reminded rather perempt orily by the Department of the 
United States' determined lack of interest in Persia. United 
States business interests virtually ignored Persia during 
this period. 
After the Labaree murder, world events and commercial 
interests began to force America to adopt new policies and 
attitudes toward Persia. Missionary influence over American 
policy gradually gave way to commercial and economic interests 
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in molding the American position in the twentieth century. 
As a powerful industrial nation it £arced her to recognize 
finally the importance of Persia both economically and strate-
gically. The lasting effects of the missionaries' good works 
of the nineteenth century £armed the basis for a solid and 
lasting £riendship and goodwill between the United States and 
Persia. 
APPENDIX I 
UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES 
IN IRAN* 
Charge d'Affaires and Consuls General 
S.G.W. Benjamin, New York, January 29, 1883. 
Ministers Resident and Consuls General 
S.G.W. Benjamin, New York, February 17, 18830 
Frederick H. Winston, Illinois, October 18, 1885. 
E. Spencer Pratt, Alabama, August 3, 1886. 
Truxton Beale, California, February 17, 1891. 
Watson R. Sperry, Delaware, July 17, 1892. 
Al exander McDonal d , Virginia, September 8, 1893. 
Arthur S. Hardy , New Hampshir e , July 12, 1897. 
Herbert W. Bow en , New York , May 3, 1899. 
Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary 
Herbert W. Bowen, New York, May 1, 1901. 
Lloyd C. Griscom, Pennsylvania, June 17, 1901. 
Richmond Pearson, North Carolina, December 17, 1902. 
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*Exc er pted from Annex I of Cultural Ti es betw een Iran and 
the United States by Ali Pasha Saleh (T eheran : Sherkat-e-
Chapkhaneh Bisto panj-e-Shahrivar, 1976) , p. 271. Dates refer 
to dates of appointment. 
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